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1 2	JAZ, A PROFESSIONAL LEGAL CORPORATION Peter F. Jazayeri (SBN 199626) peter@jaz-law.com 1925 Century Park East, Suite 1380	E Superior Count of Childrenia E County of Huffe     L JUN 1 4 2013					
3   4	Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: 310.853.2529 Facsimile: 424.239.3434	E JON 1 1 2013 E  D Kimberly Flener, Clerk D  By J. STEINBERG					
5	Attorneys for Plaintiff COASTLINE RE HOLDINGS CORP.	The first of the second					
6	CUREDIOD COURT OF THE C	TATE OF CALLEODNIA					
7	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA						
8	COUNTY OF BUTTE – CHICO COURTHOUSE						
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10	COASTLINE RE HOLDINGS CORP.,	Case No. 153737 FILED BY FAX					
11	Plaintiff,	[FURTHER PROPOSED] ORDER: (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF COASTLINE					
12	VS.	RE HOLDINGS CORP.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ET AL.; (2)					
13	OROVILLE SELF STORAGE, LLC, a California limited liability company; MSDM	DENYING DEFENDANT MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM'S MOTION FOR					
14 15	DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a California limited liability company; JOHN O'DEA, an individual; MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM, an individual; and DOES 1 through 30, inclusive,	SUMMARY JUDGMENT ET AL.; AND (3) DENYING DEFENDANT JOHN O'DEA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ET AL.					
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17	Defendants.	[Proposed Judgment Filed Concurrently Herewith]					
18		Motion Hearing:					
19		Date: April 19, 2012 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept.: C-13					
20		Judge: Hon. Sandra L. McLean					
21		Hearing on Proposed Orders: Date: June 14, 2013					
22		Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept.: C-13					
23		Judge: Honorable Sandra L. McLean					
24		Complaint Filed: May 6, 2011 Trial Date: Vacated					
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[PROPOSED] ORDER: (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF COASTLINE RE HOLDINGS CORP.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ET AL.; (2) DENYING DEFENDANT MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ET AL.; AND (3) DENYING DEFENDANT JOHN O'DEA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ET AL.

#### TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

On April 19, 2013, at 9:00 a.m., before the Honorable Sandra L. McLean of the above-entitled Court, located at 655 Oleander Avenue, in Chico, California 95926, the Motion Of Plaintiff Coastline RE Holdings Corp. ("Coastline") For A Separate And Several Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication Against Defendants Michael Cunningham ("Cunningham") And John O'Dea ("O'Dea") (the "Coastline Motion"), the Motion By Defendant Cunningham For Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication As To The Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action In Plaintiff's Complaint, And/or The Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-First Affirmative Defenses In Cunningham's Answer (the "Cunningham Motion"), the Motion By Defendant O'Dea For Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication As To The Third and Fifth Causes of Action In Plaintiff's Complaint, And/or The Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-First Affirmative Defenses In O'Dea's Answer (the "O'Dea Motion") came on regularly for hearing, the Honorable Sandra L. McLean, presiding.

Appearing for Coastline was Peter F. Jazayeri of Jaz, A Professional Legal Corporation. Appearing for Cunningham was Lawrence A. Jacobson of Cohen & Jacobson, LLP. Appearing for O'Dea was Sarah Brooks of Aaron, Riechert, Carpol & Riffle, APC.

After full consideration of the evidence, including the Coastline Motion, Coastline's Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts in support of the Coastline Motion ("Coastline's Separate Statement"), the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Coastline Motion, the Appendix of Evidence in support of the Coastline Motion (consisting of the Declaration of Robert Watts and exhibits thereto, the Declaration of Jeff Goddard and exhibits thereto, and the Declaration of Dan Platt and exhibits thereto), the Request for Judicial Notice in support of the Coastline Motion, the Oppositions to the Coastline Motion filed by Cunningham and O'Dea, the Declaration of Cunningham in support of his Opposition to the Coastline Motion and exhibits thereto (the "Cunningham Opposition Declaration"), the Declaration of O'Dea in support of his Opposition to the Coastline Motion (the "O'Dea Opposition Declaration"), the Responses to the Coastline Separate Statement filed by Cunningham and O'Dea, the Evidentiary Objections filed by Cunningham and O'Dea to the Declaration of Robert Watts and Jeffrey Goddard, Coastline's Responses to the

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Evidentiary Objections filed by Cunningham and O'Dea, the Reply in support of the Coastline Motion, Coastline's Evidentiary Objections to the Cunningham Opposition Declaration and the O'Dea Opposition Declaration, Coastline's Supplemental Brief in support of the Coastline Motion, the Supplemental Declaration of Robert Watts in support of the Coastline Motion, the Supplemental Declaration of Peter Jazayeri in support of the Coastline Motion, the Cunningham Motion, the Cunningham Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Cunningham's Motion (the "Cunningham Separate Statement"), the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Cunningham Motion, the Declaration of Michael Cunningham in support of the Cunningham Motion and exhibits thereto (the "Cunningham Declaration"), the Declaration of Lawrence Jacobson in support of the Cunningham Motion and exhibits thereto, Coastline's Opposition to the Cunningham Motion, Coastline's Appendix of Evidence filed in support of Coastline's Opposition to the Cunningham and O'Dea Motions (consisting of the Declaration of Robert Watts and exhibits thereto, the Declaration of Jeff Goddard and exhibits thereto, the Declaration of Dan Platt and exhibits thereto, the Request for Judicial Notice and exhibit thereto, the Declaration of Peter F. Jazayeri and exhibits thereto, the Declaration of Michael Cunningham in support of Opposition to Coastline's Application for a Right to Attach Order and exhibits thereto, and the Declaration of John O'Dea in support of Opposition to Coastline's Application for a Right to Attach Order), Coastline's Response to the Cunningham Separate Statement, Coastline's Evidentiary Objections to the Cunningham Declaration, Cunningham's Reply in support of the Cunningham Motion, the O'Dea Motion, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of the O'Dea Motion, O'Dea's Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts in support of the O'Dea Motion (the "O'Dea Separate Statement"), the Declaration of John O'Dea in support of the O'Dea Motion and exhibits thereto (the "O'Dea Declaration"), the Declaration of Sarah Brooks in support of the O'Dea Motion and exhibits thereto, Coastline's Opposition to the O'Dea Motion, Coastline's Evidentiary Objections to the O'Dea Declaration, Coastline's Response to the O'Dea Separate Statement, O'Dea's Reply in support of the O'Dea Motion, O'Dea's Supplemental Brief in support of the O'Dea Motion, Cunningham's Supplemental Brief in support of the Cunningham Motion, the Declaration of Lawrence Jacobson

filed in support of the Supplemental Brief (the "Jacobson Declaration"), Coastline's Evidentiary Objections to the Jacobson Declaration, and the oral argument by the parties, and good cause appearing, the Court, for the reasons set forth in its Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment and Summary Adjudication (the "Ruling," attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference), FINDS, ADJUDGES AND ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:

- The Coastline Motion is granted, the Cunningham Motion is denied, and the O'Dea Motion is denied.
- 2. As set forth in the Ruling and incorporated herein by this reference, the Court sustains Coastline's evidentiary objection to paragraph 25 of the Cunningham Declaration on the grounds that the testimony is argumentative and that Cunningham lacks foundation. As set forth in the Ruling and incorporated herein by this reference, the Court overrules all other evidentiary objections raised by Coastline as to the Cunningham Declaration.
- 3. As set forth in the Ruling and incorporated herein by this reference, the Court sustains Coastline's evidentiary objections to: (a) paragraph 14 of the O'Dea Declaration on the grounds that O'Dea lacks personal knowledge and foundation; (b) paragraph 17 of the O'Dea Declaration on the grounds that O'Dea lacks personal knowledge, lacks foundation, and that the testimony consists of inadmissible hearsay; and (c) paragraph 22 of the O'Dea Declaration on the grounds that the portion of the statement "or indicated in any fashion that the effect of the loan was in any way different than as had been discussed as indicated above" is vague and ambiguous. As set forth in the Ruling and incorporated herein by this reference, the Court overrules all other evidentiary objections raised by Coastline as to the O'Dea Declaration.
- 4. As set forth in the Ruling and incorporated herein by this reference, the Court sustains Cunningham's evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Jeff Goddard submitted by Coastline in support of the Coastline Motion and in opposition to Cunningham and O'Dea Motions (the "Goddard Declaration") with respect to paragraphs 18-20 and 24 on the grounds that Goddard lacks competence, foundation, or personal knowledge as to any

knowledge that would have been acquired prior to the time that Pacific Western Bank had control of the loan file. As set forth in the Ruling and incorporated herein by this reference, the Court overrules all other evidentiary objections raised by Cunningham as to the Goddard Declaration.

- 5. As set forth in the Ruling and incorporated herein by this reference, the Court overrules all of Cunningham's evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Robert Watts submitted by Coastline in support of the Coastline Motion and in opposition to Cunningham and O'Dea Motions.
- 6. As set forth in the Ruling and incorporated herein by this reference, the Court sustains Coastline's evidentiary objections to the O'Dea Opposition Declaration with respect to paragraph 14, page 3, lines 22-24 on the grounds that O'Dea lacks personal knowledge, lacks foundation, and that the testimony consists of inadmissible hearsay. As set forth in the Ruling and incorporated herein by this reference, the Court overrules all other evidentiary objections raised by Coastline as to the O'Dea Opposition Declaration.
- 7. As set forth in the Ruling and incorporated herein by this reference, the Court sustains Coastline's evidentiary objections to the Cunningham Opposition Declaration with respect to: (a) paragraph 14, page 3, lines 9 to 15 on the grounds that the testimony is barred by the parol evidence rule; (b) paragraph 18 on the grounds that the testimony irrelevant; (c) paragraph 20, page 4, lines 25 to page 5, line 2 on the grounds that the testimony asserts a legal conclusion; (d) paragraph 25 on the grounds that that the testimony asserts a legal conclusion, is argumentative, and lacks foundation; and (e) paragraph 26 on the grounds that the testimony consists of inadmissible of hearsay. As set forth in the Ruling and incorporated herein by this reference, the Court overrules all other evidentiary objections raised by Coastline as to the Cunningham Opposition Declaration.
- 8. The sham guaranty defense and associated affirmative defenses asserted by Cunningham and O'Dea (specifically, the 18<sup>th</sup> affirmative defense asserting Code of Civil Procedure §

580d, the 19<sup>th</sup> affirmative defense asserting Code of Civil Procedure § 726, and 21<sup>st</sup> affirmative defense are asserting artificial loan structure) are barred by 12 U.S.C. § 1823 pursuant to the doctrine of federal preemption as set forth in the Ruling.

- 9. Based upon the record presented, Coastline has made a proper showing that it is entitled to summary judgment, and Cunningham and O'Dea have not controverted that showing.
- 10. Coastline's Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of the Coastline Motion, Facts 1 through 52, inclusive, are established to be true by competent evidence. Cunningham and O'Dea have not controverted any of such facts with competent evidence. For the reasons set forth in the Ruling, these uncontroverted facts entitle Coastline to judgment as a matter of law in favor of Coastline as to the Third Cause of Action for Breach of Guaranty against O'Dea and as to the Fourth Cause of Action for Breach of Guaranty against Cunningham.
- 11. Coastline is the prevailing party in this case and shall be entitled to an award of its attorney's fees and costs to be established by a future memorandum of costs and motion pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1700 et seq.

Dated:

JUN 1 4 2013

SANDRA L. McLEAN

Honorable Sandra L. McLean

# **EXHIBIT A**

Superior Court of California County of Butte MAY 9 8 2013 ktmberty Flener, Clerk D SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF BUTTE 10

> PACIFIC WESTERN BANK, Plaintiff,

vs.

OROVILLE SELF STORAGE, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 153737

RULING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

This ruling addresses three motions heard on April 19, 2013 on the 9:00 a.m. calendar: Plaintiff's motion for separate and several summary judgment as to defendants Cunningham and O'Dea, the motion of Defendant Cunningham for summary judgment/ adjudication, and the motion of Defendant O'Dea for summary judgment/adjudication. At the April 19 hearing, the Court asked for additional briefing, to be filed by April 26, and took the motions under submission.

This is a case arising out of default on a loan made by Plaintiff's predecessor, Affinity Bank, in January of 2007, for

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construction of a self-storage facility. The individual defendants, Cunningham and O'Dea, signed as guarantors on the loan. The loan was a construction loan for over \$5,000,000. The loan went into default in December of 2010.

The complaint is for 1) judicial foreclosure, 2) specific performance of right to possession under deed of trust by appointment of receiver, 3) breach of guaranty, 4) breach of guaranty, 5) breach of contract, and 6) injunctive relief. All causes of action other than the Third and Fourth now have been dismissed.

#### MOTION OF DEFENDANTS CUNNINGHAM & SELF STORAGE

Defendants Cunningham and Oroville Self Storage move for summary judgment and summary adjudication on the Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action and/or the Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-First affirmative defenses.

#### Evidentiary Rulings

# Objections of Plaintiff to Cunningham Declaration

Defendant Cunningham filed a declaration in support of his motion. The objections to that declaration and rulings thereon are as follows.

- Par.11. "The Loan Applications that were presented to John O'Dea and me as being applications that would form the basis for the Bank's making of the Construction Loan were made individually by John O'Dea and me..."
  - 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
  - 2. Lacks foundation. Overruled.
  - 3. Asserts legal conclusion. Overruled.

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Par.14. "While the request for credit information was directed to John O'Dea and to me personally, representatives of Affinity Bank advised us that the information pertained to the substantiation of our personal responsibility as Borrowers with the expectation that the Storage Facility would be constructed; that the real property and improvements (the 'Collateral') would be the collateral for the Construction Loan; that John O'Dea and I would arrange for the construction and for the making of the payments from the reserve account established for that purpose; and that the intended source of repayment would be the collateral rather than from personal income or assets. While our Individual Loan Applications and personal tax returns reflected financial responsibility, those statements and returns did not reflect, and were not submitted for the purpose of establishing, an ability to pay the Construction Loan other than from the income of or proceeds of sale from the Collateral."

- 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
- 2. Lacks foundation. Overruled.
- 3. Asserts legal conclusion. Overruled.
- 4. Hearsay. Overruled.
- 5. Argumentative. Overruled.

Par.15. "In order to fund the Construction Loan, Affinity Bank required that Cunningham and I submit... (a) detailed construction plans and drawings, (b) information concerning permits to be required for construction, (c) a construction budget, and (d) pro forma operating statement of the Collateral upon completion of construction indicating projected income, expense, profitability and source of cash from operations for payment of the Construction Loan."

- 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
- 2. Lacks foundation. Overruled.

Par.18. "...representatives of Affinity Bank instructed John O'Dea and me to form a new limited liability company as the entity to hold title to the Collateral for this business loan as an administrative convenience for Affinity Bank. The representatives who made such instruction further advised that this structure would not alter the substance of the loan in terms of the bank considering John O'Dea and me to be the 'Borrowers' and the Collateral to be the intended source of repayment."

- 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
- 2. Lacks foundation. Overruled.
- 3. Hearsay. Overruled.
- Par.19. "Based upon such instruction, John O'Dea and I

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formed an entity known as Oroville Self Storage, LLC, and so advised the Bank with a confirming letter dated December 6, 2006... containing content specified by Affinity Bank. This confirming letter states in part: 'The sole purpose of Oroville Self Storage, LLC is to acquire the land and develop a 130,000 sq foot self storage facility.' The letter also advised that Oroville Self Storage, LLC, had no funding other than those monies available to the Borrowers that the Borrowers had otherwise intended to utilize in the acquisition of the land for the project."

- 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
- 2. Lacks foundation. Overruled.
- 3. Hearsay. Overruled.
- 4. Unduly prejudicial, confusing, or misleading. Overruled.

Par.20. "As indicated by the statements above, and by the Letter Confirming Entity Formation, at all times I (a) understood that the formation of Oroville Self Storage, LLC was a requirement interposed by Affinity Bank for an unspecified administrative convenience and not to alter the substantive rights of the Borrowers; (b) intended that the formation of the limited liability company would be utilized for that purpose and not to evade the anti-deficiency prohibitions as to O'Dea and me; and (c) acted upon the advice from Affinity Bank that the individuals would hold the status as 'Borrowers'. I was never informed by Affinity Bank, or anyone else that the formation of the Oroville Self Storage, LLC would alter the substantive rights of the Borrowers, or that it would be utilized to evade the anti-deficiency prohibitions as to O'Dea and myself."

- 1. Asserts legal conclusion. Overruled.
- 2. Vague and ambiguous as to "for an unspecified administrative convenience." Overruled.
  - 3. Argumentative. Overruled.
  - 4. Hearsay. Overruled.
  - 5. Asserts a legal conclusion. Overruled.
  - 6. Lacks foundation. Overruled.

Par.25. "Rather than being a matter of administrative convenience with no substantive distinction, this artificial structure was an attempt by Affinity Bank to avoid the antideficiency statues ..."

- 1. Asserts legal conclusion. Overruled.
- 2. Vague and ambiguous as to "for an unspecified administrative convenience." Overruled.
  - 3. Argumentative. Sustained.
  - 4. Hearsay. Overruled.

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- 5. Asserts a legal conclusion. Overruled.
- 6. Lacks foundation. Sustained.

Par.26. "At no time did Affinity ever explain to me that John O'Dea and I would have deficiency liability after a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. To the contrary, Affinity Bank represented that the structure of utilizing the limited liability company had no effect on the bar against deficiency after nonjudicial foreclosure. The lack of any substantive change by utilizing the limited liability structure, as explained by Affinity Bank, made sense to me in that (a) the Uniform Residential Loan Applications recited that John O'Dea and I were the 'Borrowers', (b) the language of the Deed of Trust appeared to support the comprehensive scope of that lien as the recourse, (c) the establishment of the reserve account provided the source of funds for making the payments and (d) the concentration of focus and effort on constructing a facility that would generate the funds for debt service was consistent with our understanding that we would not have deficiency liability after a foreclosure sale."

- 1. Asserts legal conclusion. Overruled.
- 2. Hearsay. Overruled.
- 3. Argumentative. Overruled.

## Causes of Action

# Fourth Cause of Action - Breach of Guaranty

Coastline, successor in interest to the original lender, Affinity Bank, sold the collateral by judicial foreclosure after the filing of this action. After taking into account the credit bid, Coastline claims a deficiency of \$3,130,599.97. Coastline now is proceeding against the individual guarantors for that deficiency.

Defendant Cunningham contends that the Fourth Cause of Action, for breach of guaranty, has no merit because the individuals, Cunningham and O'Dea, were the true borrowers, and therefore the sham guaranty defense is applicable. If that is

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the case, the collateral at issue having been non-judicially foreclosed, Plaintiff cannot recover any deficiency against Cunningham.

# Sham Guaranty Defense

The anti-deficiency laws embodied in CCP §580a through §580d and CCP §726 reflect a legislative policy that strictly limits the right to recover deficiency judgments where the amount of the debt exceeds the value of the security. Brown v. Jensen (1953) 41 Cal.2d 193, 197. The anti-deficiency legislation was established for a public reason and cannot be contravened by a private agreement. Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner (1964) 230 Cal. App. 2d 106, 112. A quarantor may expressly waive the protections of the antideficiency laws. Mariners Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Neil (1971) 22 Cal. App. 3d 232, 235-237. However, "to collect a deficiency from a guarantor, he must be a true quarantor and not merely the principal debtor under a different name. "The protections afforded debtors under the antideficiency laws cannot be subverted by artifice, and a substantial body of law has developed to protect the principal debtor against personal liability in cases in which the principal debtor purports to take on additional liability as a guarantor." Cadle Co.II v. Harvey (2000) 83 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 927, 932. the present case, if Defendants can establish that they were not true guarantors, but actually were the borrowers, Plaintiff will be prohibited from collecting the deficiency against them.

In support of the contention that defendants Cunningham and O'Dea were the "true borrowers", defendant Cunningham submits the following purported Undisputed Facts:

Fact #6: "The Loan Applications with respect to the Construction Loan identify Cunningham and John O'Dea as the 'Borrowers.'" In support of this statement, defendant submits the declaration of Cunningham, Par.11, 14, 18, and Exh A to Cunningham declaration (at vol.6 of the court file), a loan application signed by the individuals and showing them as borrowers.

In opposition, Plaintiff refers to the declaration of Watts (also in vol.6), to which is attached, at Exh A, a loan application which names the individuals as borrows at the top of the first page, but names Oroville Self Storage, LLC, as borrower lower down on the same page. As it cannot be determined at this stage which of these documents was the actual loan application, this Fact must be deemed disputed.

Facts #7 and #8 are that the Bank requested tax return information from the individual guarantors. Fact #9 is that Cunningham advised the Bank by letter that the sole purpose of the LLC was to acquire the land upon which the self-storage facility would be constructed. Fact #10 is that the only funding available to the LLC upon its inception was from funds available to the individuals. Fact #11 is that the LLC is owned solely by these two individuals. Fact #12 is that Cunningham was not asked

for any financial information pertaining to the LLC, and Fact #13 is that no financial information pertaining to the LLC was provided to the Bank. All these facts are essentially undisputed. Fact #14 is that the LLC was created on November 6, 2006 and had no income, assets, credit history, banking history, or any other financial background as of January, 2007. Plaintiff disputes this statement with evidence that the LLC owned real property as of January 17, 2007. Fact #15 is that the LLC did not complete a loan application. This is disputed by evidence of an application made out in the name of the LLC as borrower, which is attached at Exh.A to the Watts declaration.

Under Civil Code \$2787, a guarantor is one that agrees to answer for the debt of another, and so cannot be the borrower under a different name. The factors to be considered are those set out in River Bank America v. Diller (1995) 38 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1400, 1420-1421: 1) the lender appears to have structured the transaction to avoid anti-deficiency rules, 2) the nominal borrower entity is an uncapitalized corporation, 3) the nominal borrower entity is owned entirely by the individual guarantors, 4) the lender did not investigate the financial wherewithal of the nominal borrower, 5) the nominal borrower entity had no substantial capital or assets, 6) the structure of the agreement was changed at the instruction of the lender, 7) the nominal entity borrower was brought into existence for the purpose of the proposed financing, 8) the lender researched the financial

strength of the purported guarantors because they were the parties truly considered the borrowers, 9) aside from the borrowed funds, the individuals contributed the only monies that went into the nominal borrower entity.

Defendant argues that virtually all of the River Bank factors are in his favor. The bank asked for creation of the LLC, the LLC was not capitalized, the sole members of the LLC are Cunningham and O'Dea, the lender did not investigate the financial wherewithal of the LLC, but only of the individuals, the LLC had no credit history or any other kind of history, and other than the borrowed funds, Cunningham and O'Dea provided the only funds that went into the LLC. There is evidence the loan application was signed and submitted by Cunningham and O'Dea as "borrowers". Also, Defendant argues that all the reasons for the anti-deficiency laws are illustrated by the circumstances of this case; the bank overvalued the security in lending, the bank made and accepted a low credit bid upon sale, etc.

The arguments and evidence submitted by Cunningham do tend to support the theory that the guarantors in this case were actually the borrowers. This evidence would be sufficient to create a question of fact for the jury on the sham guaranty defense. The dispute between the parties as to the meaning of the document could only be properly determined by a consideration of all the facts and circumstances surrounding its execution.

Ordinarily, "[f]acts which tend to illustrate or explain the

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language used in the contract, and to place the court or jury as nearly as may be in the situation of the parties as they contracted, are always admissible when the meaning of the terms used is debatable." Superior Wholesale Electric Co. v. Cameron, 264 Cal. App. 2d 488, 492-493 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1968). However, the original lender in the present case, Affinity Bank, failed, and was taken into receivership by the FDIC. This brings into play certain federal legislation.

#### 12 USC §1823

Under 12 USC §1823(e), and D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 US 447 (1942), the maker of a note is estopped from arguing that it had a side agreement with the failed bank that a note could not be collected. In RTC Mortgage Trust v. Schlens (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 304, 316, the court rejected a borrower's attempt to assert state law defenses, and affirmed the grant of a summary judgment in favor of the lender because \$1823(e) exists to allow federal and state bank examiners to rely on a bank's records in evaluating the worth of the bank's assets, enable a swift transition of a failed bank to another bank, prevent debtors from profiting from fraudulent insertion of new terms, and avoid saddling deposit insurers, taxpayers, or creditors with inequitable losses. This principle extends to assignees of the FDIC. It precludes claims that a document means something different than what it says on its face. Weber v. New West (1992) 10 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 97, 108.

In FDIC v. Zook Bros 973 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992), the Court enforced a guaranty "because the FDIC under D'Oench and Section 1823(e) is entitled to rely on documents in a loan file, and there is no basis for Zook's defenses based on state law as they depend on inferences contravening the guaranty which are raised, and may be provide, only by reference to documents which do not meet the requirements of Section 1823(e)."

In the present case, Defendant argues that \$1823 is not applicable because there is no "side agreement" alleged, rather, the defense of sham guaranty exists as a matter of law based on all the circumstances of the loan transaction, as described in the Undisputed Facts set forth above.

The Court finds that the theory underlying Defendant's sham guaranty defense does constitute a side agreement, because it relies on an understanding between the parties which does not appear from the face of the operative documents. Certain statements asserted both in Cunningham's Points & Authorities in support of his motion and in his Declaration, although not included in his Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, further support this interpretation. Two of these assertions are that "representatives of Affinity Bank instructed John O'Dea and me to form a new limited liability company as the entity to hold title to the Collateral for this business loan as an 'administrative convenience' for Affinity Bank" (par.18 of the Cunningham declaration) and "Affinity Bank represented that the structure of

utilizing the limited liability company had no effect on the bar against deficiency after non-judicial foreclosure" (par.26 of the Cunningham declaration). These statements tend to indicate that defendant Cunningham's theory arises out of an alleged "side agreement".

Defendant argues that Plaintiff should be estopped to assert the bar of Section 1823 because this theory has not previously been raised by Plaintiff, either in discovery responses or otherwise, and trial is less than one month away. The Court finds, however, that the response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is an appropriate time to raise this issue, and further that the issue has been raised, albeit without specific mention of 12 USC \$1823, in the general allegations at paragraph 1 of the Complaint setting out the FDIC involvement after failure of the original lending institution.

The Court finds that the 12 USC \$1823 does apply to bar the sham guaranty defense in this case, based on federal preemption. Although there may be some ambiguity created by certain documents generated during the application and negotiation process, the FDIC and its successors are entitled to rely upon the final agreement between the parties. That agreement consists of the note and deed of trust, and includes the guaranties signed by the individual defendants herein. The motion of Mr. Cunningham for summary adjudication on this cause of action, therefore, is denied.

#### Sixth Cause of Action

Defendant contends that the Sixth Cause of Action for injunctive relief has no merit because the collateral at issue was non-judicially foreclosed, thereby rendering moot all relief sought in the Sixth Cause of Action.

This cause of action was dismissed on April 18, 2013, without prejudice. The motion is granted as to the Sixth Cause of action.

# 18th Affirmative Defense

Defendant contends that the One Form of Action Rule is a complete defense on the grounds that Cunningham and O'Dea were the true borrowers, that the purported guaranty fails under the sham guaranty defense, that the collateral was non-judicially foreclosed, and that Plaintiff cannot recover any deficiency against Cunningham.

The motion is denied for the reasons previously discussed under the heading "Fourth Cause of Action", above.

# 19th Affirmative Defense

Defendant contends that the Anti-Deficiency Rule provides a complete defense on the grounds that Cunningham and O'Dea were the true borrowers, that the purported guaranty fails under the sham guaranty defense, that the collateral was non-judicially foreclosed, and that Plaintiff cannot recover any deficiency against Cunningham.

The motion for summary adjudication is denied for the

reasons already discussed.

### 21st Affirmative Defense

Defendant contends that the sham guaranty defense (artificial loan structure) provides a complete defense on the grounds that Cunningham and O'Dea were the true borrowers, that the purported guaranty fails under the sham guaranty defense, that the collateral was non-judicially foreclosed, and that Plaintiff cannot recover any deficiency against Cunningham.

The motion is denied for the reasons already discussed.

#### MOTION OF DEFENDANT O'DEA

Defendant moves for summary adjudication of the Third and Fifth Causes of Action and the 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> Affirmative Defenses. This motion closely tracks the Cunningham motion.

#### Procedural Matters

#### Plaintiff's Objections to Declaration of O'Dea

- Par.9. "The credit applications that formed the basis for the making of the Construction Loan were made individually by Cunningham and me (sometimes referred to jointly as the 'Borrowers'...)."
  - 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
  - 2. Lacks foundation. Overruled.
- Par.13. "In order to fund the Construction Loan, Affinity Bank required that Cunningham and I submit... (a) detailed construction plans and drawings, (b) information concerning permits to be required for construction, (c) a construction budget, and (d) pro forma operating statement of the Collateral upon completion of construction indicating projected income, expense, profitability and source of cash from operations for payment of the Construction Loan."
  - 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
  - 2. Lacks foundation. Overruled.

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- Par.14. "The valuation utilized by Affinity Bank was reflected in that Appraisal Report dated November 28, 2006, as prepared by PGP Valuation ... that established the value of the Collateral by alternative methods as follows: Cost Approach: \$7,810,000; Income Approach: \$7,880,000; Sales Comparison Approach: \$8,010,000."
  - 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Sustained.
  - 2. Lacks foundation. Sustained.
- Par.15. "Based upon construction loan funding in the amount of \$5,176,500, the equity in the Collateral above the loan balance under the alternative valuations was: Equity Per Cost Approach: \$2,633,500; Equity Per Income Approach: \$2,703,500; Equity Per Sales Comparison Approach: \$2,833.500."
  - 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
  - 2. Lacks foundation. Overruled.
- Par.17. "representatives of Affinity Bank instructed Cunningham, and Cunningham instructed me, to form a new limited liability company as the entity to hold title to the Collateral for this business loan as an administrative convenience for Affinity Bank."
- 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Sustained, as to what representatives of Affinity Bank instructed Cunningham to do.
  - 2. Lacks foundation. Sustained.
  - 3. Hearsay. Sustained.
- Par.18. "Based upon such instruction, John O'Dea and I formed an entity known as Oroville Self Storage, LLC, and so advised the Bank with a confirming letter dated December 6, 2006... containing content specified by Affinity Bank. This confirming letter states in part: 'The sole purpose of Oroville Self Storage, LLC is to acquire the land and develop a 130,000 sq foot self storage facility.' The letter also advised that Oroville Self Storage, LLC, had no funding other than those monies available to the Borrowers that the Borrowers had otherwise intended to utilize in the acquisition of the land for the project."
  - 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
  - 2. Lacks foundation. Overruled.
  - 3. Hearsay. Overruled.
  - 4. Unduly prejudicial, confusing, or misleading. Overruled.
- Par.19. As indicated by the statements above, and by the Letter Confirming Entity Formation, at all times I (a) understood

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that the formation of Oroville Self Storage, LLC was a requirement interposed by Affinity Bank for an unspecified administrative convenience and not to alter the substantive rights of the Borrowers; (b) intended that the formation of the limited liability company would be utilized for that purpose and not to evade the anti-deficiency prohibitions as to O'Dea and me; and (c) acted upon the advice from Affinity Bank that the individuals would hold the status as 'Borrowers'. I was never informed by Affinity Bank, or anyone else that the formation of the Oroville Self Storage, LLC would alter the substantive rights of the Borrowers, or that it would be utilized to evade the anti-deficiency prohibitions as to Cunningham and myself."

- 1. Asserts legal conclusion. Overruled.
- 2. Vague and ambiguous as to "for an unspecified administrative convenience." Overruled.
- Par.22. "No representative of Affinity Bank was present at the signing of the documents, and no one acting on behalf of Affinity Bank offered any explanation of the documents or indicated in any fashion that the effect of the loan was in any way different than as had been discussed as indicated above."
- 1. Vague and ambiguous as to the phrase "or indicated in any fashion that the effect of the loan was in any way different than as had been discussed as indicated above." Sustained.
- Par.23. "At no time did Affinity ever explain to me that Cunningham and I would have deficiency liability after a non-judicial foreclosure sale."
  - 1. Asserts legal conclusion. Overruled.
- Par.28. "This bid amount represents approximately 55% of the amount claimed due at the date of the sale, and represents 36% of the lowest appraised value utilized by Affinity in making the Construction Loan."
  - 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
  - 2. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
  - 3. Lacks foundation. Overruled.
  - 4. Argumentative. Overruled.

#### Analysis

Because, as already discussed in connection with the Cunningham motion, 12 USC §1823 bars application of the sham

guaranty defense in this case under the theory of federal preemption, the motion is denied.

### PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the Third and Fourth Causes of Action, for breach of guaranty, against the two individual defendants based on failure to pay the deficiency amount due on the loan after the foreclosure sale.

#### Evidentiary Rulings

# Objections of Cunningham to Goddard & Watts Declarations

#### Goddard Declaration

Mr. Goddard declares that he is an executive vice-president for Pacific Western Bank (PWB), of which plaintiff Coastline is a wholly owned subsidiary. Mr. Goddard testifies about the background facts of the loan. However Mr. Goddard only took over the loan in 2009, when PWB obtained the loan from the FDIC. At par.7 of his declaration, Mr. Goddard indicates that, throughout his testimony, "Bank" refers to PWB and Affinity Bank, collectively. He does not indicate how he has any knowledge of Affinity Bank's practices and procedures.

- Par. 18. "On or about January 17, 2007, for valuable consideration, Borrower and Affinity entered into a Construction Loan Agreement ... pursuant to which Plaintiff entered into a loan in the principal amount of \$5,176,500 plus interest for purposes of constructing a 660-unit self-storage facility."
- 1. Lacks competence. Sustained as to any knowledge that would have to have been acquired prior to the time PWB had control of the loan file.
- 2. Lack of personal knowledge. Sustained as to any knowledge that would have to have been acquired prior to the time

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PWB had control of the loan file.

- 3. Lack of foundation. Sustained as to any knowledge that would have to have been acquired prior to the time PWB had control of the loan file.
  - 4. Hearsay. Overruled.
- 5. Contradicts verified discovery responses. Overruled; Cunningham has not provided citation to the pertinent discovery responses.
- Par. 19. "In connection with the Construction Loan, Borrower, as maker, executed and delivered to Affinity as holder, a Promissory Note dated January 17, 2007 in the original principal face amount of \$5,176,500... Based on the Construction Loan, Initial Note and other documents pertaining to the Construction Loan, including a Deed of Trust, an Assignment of Rents, a Change in Terms Agreement, and two Commercial Guaranty Agreement, Affinity loaned \$5,176,500 in principal amount ot borrower."
- 1. Lacks competence. Sustained as to any knowledge that would have to have been acquired prior to the time PWB had control of the loan file.
- 2. Lack of personal knowledge. Sustained as to any knowledge that would have to have been acquired prior to the time PWB had control of the loan file.
- 3. Lack of foundation. Sustained as to any knowledge that would have to have been acquired prior to the time PWB had control of the loan file.
  - 4. Hearsay. Overruled.
- 5. Contradicts verified discovery responses. Overruled; Cunningham has not provided citation to the pertinent discovery responses.
- Par.20. "Having reviewed the Loan Documents, I am familiar with the transaction set forth in the Loan Documents between Affinity and Borrower. Pursuant to the Loan Documents, Borrower promised to pay Affinity monthly installments of interest and principal. The Loan Documents also provide for the payment of all costs, including reasonable attorneys fees, in any action to enforce any of PWB's rights thereunder."
- 1. Lacks competence. Sustained as to any knowledge that would have to have been acquired prior to the time PWB had control of the loan file.
- 2. Lack of personal knowledge. Sustained as to any knowledge that would have to have been acquired prior to the time PWB had control of the loan file.
- 3. Lack of foundation. Sustained as to any knowledge that would have to have been acquired prior to the time PWB had

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control of the loan file.

- 4. Hearsay. Overruled.
- 5. Contradicts verified discovery responses. Overruled; Cunningham has not provided citation to the pertinent discovery responses.
- Par.24. "On or about January 17, 2007, Affinity and Cunningham entered into a Commercial Guaranty Agreement ... pursuant to which Cunningham absolutely and unconditionally guaranteed Borrower's obligations pursuant the Loan Documents."
- 1. Lacks competence. Sustained as to any knowledge that would have to have been acquired prior to the time PWB had control of the loan file.
- 2. Lack of personal knowledge. Sustained as to any knowledge that would have to have been acquired prior to the time PWB had control of the loan file.
- 3. Lack of foundation. Sustained as to any knowledge that would have to have been acquired prior to the time PWB had control of the loan file.
  - 4. Hearsay. Overruled.
- 5. Contradicts verified discovery responses. Overruled; Cunningham has not provided citation to the pertinent discovery responses.

#### Watts Declaration

- Mr. Watts testifies that (unlike Goddard) he worked for Affinity, and sets forth in detail his knowledge of the record keeping procedures at Affinity Bank.
- Par.1. "...the obligations owed by Oroville Self-Storage, LLC ('Borrower') and Michael Cunningham ('Cunningham') and John O'Dea ('O'Dea') which is the subject of this lawsuit."
- 1. Lacks competence. Overruled. The quoted material contains no assertion to which this objection can be addressed.
- 2. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled. The quoted material contains no assertion to which this objection can be addressed.
- 3. Lack of foundation. Overruled. The quoted material contains no assertion to which this objection can be addressed.
- 4. Hearsay. Overruled. The quoted material contains no assertion to which this objection can be addressed.
- Par.3. "In my role as Director of Asset Disposition, I was the bank officer most knowledgeable and familiar with the loan to

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Borrower."

- 1. Lacks competence. Overruled.
- 2. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
- 3. Lack of foundation. Overruled.
- 4. Hearsay. Overruled.

Par.8, 4:4-7. "With respect to this loan, Borrower, working with its broker ... submitted a loan application that was executed by its members and managers, O'Dea and Cunningham, on behalf of Borrower on or about December 6, 2006."

- 1. Lacks competence. Overruled.
- Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
   Lack of foundation. Overruled.
- 4. Hearsay. Overruled.

Par.8, 4:8-13. "In addition, concurrently with the loan application, Borrower also submitted a copy of [various documents]."

- 1. Lacks competence. Overruled.
- Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
   Lack of foundation. Overruled.
- 4. Hearsay. Overruled.

Par.9, 4:21-24. "On or about January 17, 2007, for valuable consideration, Borrower and Affinity entered into a Construction Loan Agreement ... pursuant to which Plaintiff entered into a loan in principal amount of \$5,175,400 plus interest for purposes of constructing a 660-unit self-storage facility."

- 1. Lacks competence. Overruled.
- 2. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
- 3. Lack of foundation. Overruled.
- 4. Hearsay. Overruled.

Par.10, 4:26-5:5. "In connection with the Construction Loan, Borrower, as maker, executed and delivered to Affinity as holder, a Promissory Note dated January 17, 2007 in the original principal fact amount of \$5,176,500 ... Based on the Construction Loan, Initial Note and other documents pertaining to the Construction Loan, including a Deed of Trust, an Assignment of Rents, a Change In Terms Agreement, and two Commercial Guaranty Agreements, Affinity loaned \$5,176,500 in principal amount to Borrower."

- 1. Lacks competence. Overruled.
- 2. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.

- 3. Lack of foundation. Overruled.
- 4. Hearsay. Overruled.

Par.13, 5:19-21. "On or about January 17, 2007, Affinity and Cunningham entered into a Commercial Guaranty Agreement ... pursuant to which Cunningham absolutely and unconditionally guaranteed Borrower's obligations pursuant to the Loan Documents."

- 1. Lacks competence. Overruled.
- 2. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
- 3. Lack of foundation. Overruled.
- 4. Hearsay. Overruled.

Par.14, 5:27-6:1. "In reliance on the Guaranty, Affinity extended credit to Borrower, at Borrower's request, and pursuant to the terms of the Note, in the principal sum of \$5,176,500."

- 1. Lacks competence. Overruled.
- 2. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
- 3. Lack of foundation. Overruled.
- 4. Hearsay. Overruled.

Par.14, 5:27-6:1. "Affinity performed each and all of the obligations and conditions precedent required of it under the Loan Documents including loaning money to Borrower."

- 1. Lacks competence. Overruled.
- 2. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
- 3. Lack of foundation. Overruled.
- 4. Hearsay. Overruled.

#### Watts Declaration, All Exhibits.

Cunningham argues that the Exhibits are not properly authenticated because Watts states he transferred all documents out of his custody in 2009, and therefore there is a failure in the chain of custody.

Overruled. The Court finds that the chain of custody requirements are satisfied by the combined declarations of Goddard, Watts and Platt.

### Plaintiff's Objections to O'Dea Declaration

Par.14, 3:22-24. "representatives of Affinity Bank instructed Cunningham, and Cunningham instructed me, to form a new limited liability company as the entity to hold title to the Collateral for this business loan as an administrative

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convenience for Affinity Bank."

- 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Sustained, as to what Affinity Bank said to Cunningham.
- 2. Lacks foundation. Sustained, as to what Affinity Bank said to cunningham.
- 3. Hearsay. Sustained, as to what Affinity Bank said to Cunningham.
- Par.16, 4:11-12. "at all times I understood that the formation of Oroville Self Storage, LLC was a requirement interposed by Affinity Bank for an unspecified administrative convenience."
  - 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
  - 2. Lacks foundation. Overruled.
- Par.16, 4:12-15. "I was never informed by Affinity Bank or anyone else, that formation of Oroville Self Storage, LLC would alter the substantive rights of the Borrowers, or that it would be utilized to evade the anti-deficiency prohibitions as to Cunningham and myself."
  - 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
  - 2. Lacks foundation. Overruled.
  - 3. Argumentative. Overruled.
  - 4. Asserts legal conclusion. Overruled.
  - 5. Unduly prejudicial, confusing, or misleading. Overruled.
- Par.16, 4:15-16. "I understood, based on Cunningham's communications with Affinity Bank, that Cunningham and I would hold the status as 'Borrowers'."
  - 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
  - 2. Lacks foundation. Overruled.
  - 3. Argumentative. Overruled.
  - 4. Asserts legal conclusion. Overruled.
- Par.26, 6:21-23. "This bid amount represents approximately fifty-five percent of the amount claimed due at the date of the sale, and represents thirty-six percent of the lowest appraised value utilized by Affinity in making the Construction Loan."
  - 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
  - 2. Lacks foundation. Overruled.

### Plaintiff's Objections to Declaration of Cunningham

Par.11. "as being applications that would form the basis for

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the Bank's making of the Construction Loan .... "

- 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
- 2. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
- 3. Lacks foundation. Overruled.
- 4. Asserts legal conclusion. Overruled.
- 5. Irrelevant. Overruled.
- 6. Barred by Parol Evidence Rule. Overruled.

Par.14, 3:9-15. "representatives of Affinity Bank advised us that that information pertained to the substantiation of our personal responsibility as Borrowers with the expectation that the Storage Facility would be constructed; that the real property and improvements ... would be the collateral for the Construction Loan; that John O'Dea and I would arrange for the construction and for the making of the payments from the reserve account established for that purpose; and that the intended source of repayment would be the collateral rather than from personal income or assets."

- 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
- 2. Lacks foundation. Overruled.
- 3. Asserts legal conclusion. Overruled.
- 4. Hearsay. Overruled.
- 5. Argumentative. Overruled.
- 6. Irrelevant. Overruled.
- 7. Barred by Parol Evidence Rule. Sustained.

Par.14, 3:15-18. "While our Individual Loan Applications and personal tax returns reflected financial responsibility, those statements and returns did not reflect, and were not submitted for the purpose of establishing, an ability to pay the construction Loan other than from the income of or proceeds of sale from the Collateral."

- 1. Lack per personal knowledge. Overruled.
- 2. Argumentative. Overruled.

Par.18. "...representatives of Affinity Bank instructed John O'Dea and me to form a new limited liability company as the entity to hold title to the Collateral for this business loan as an administrative convenience for Affinity Bank. The representatives who made such instruction further advised that this structure would not alter the substance of the loan in terms of the bank considering John O'Dea and me to be the 'Borrowers' and the Collateral to be the intended source of repayment."

- 1. Lack of personal knowledge. Overruled.
- 2. Lacks foundation. Overruled.

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- 3. Hearsay. Overruled.
- 4. Irrelevant. Sustained.
- Par.20, 4:25-5:2. "As indicated by the statement above, and by the Letter Confirming Entity Formation, at all times I (a) understood that the formation of Oroville Self Storage, LLC was a requirement interposed by Affinity Bank for an unspecified administrative convenience and not to alter the substantive rights of the Borrowers; (b) intended that the formation of the limited liability company would be utilized for that purpose and not to evade the anti-deficiency prohibitions as to O'Dea and me; and (c) acted upon the advice from Affinity Bank that the individuals would hold the status as 'Borrowers'."
  - 1. Asserts legal conclusion. Sustained.
- 2. Vague and ambiguous as to the phrase "for an unspecified administrative convenience." Overruled
  - 3. Argumentative. Overruled.
  - 4. Hearsay. Overruled.
  - 5. Lacks foundation. Overruled.
- "Rather than being a matter of administrative Par.25. convenience with no substantive distinction, this artificial structure was an attempt by Affinity Bank to avoid the antideficiency statutes ... "
  - 1. Asserts legal conclusion. Sustained.
- 2. Vague and ambiguous as to the phrase "an administrative convenience with no substantive distinction." Overruled.
  - 3. Argumentative. Sustained.
  - 4. Hearsay. Overruled.

  - 5. Lacks foundation. Sustained.6. Unduly prejudicial, confusing, or misleading.
- "At no time did Affinity ever explain that John Par. 26. O'Dea and I would have deficiency liability after a non-judicial foreclosure sale. To the contrary, Affinity Bank represented that the structure of utilizing the limited liability company had no effect on the bar against deficiency after non-judicial foreclosure...."
  - 1. Asserts legal conclusion. Overruled.
  - 2. Hearsay. Sustained.
  - 3. Argumentative. Overruled.
  - 4. Lacks foundation. Overruled.
  - 5. Unduly prejudicial, confusing, or misleading. Overruled.

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#### Analysis

The undisputed facts show that the defendants signed as guarantors on the loan. Further, the LLC defaulted in payment on the loan. Cunningham and O'Dea, as guarantors, have not made any payments on the loan. The language of the note and guaranties provides that Defendants waive the anti-deficiency provisions of California law. The only substantive defense raised by the defendants is the defense of sham guaranty and, as set forth above, the Court finds that this defense is barred by 12 USC \$1823(e), based on federal preemption.

The plaintiff's motion is granted.

#### CONCLUSION

The motion of Defendant Cunningham is denied. The motion of Defendant O'Dea is denied. The motion of Plaintiff is granted. Plaintiff is to prepare the forms of order.

Sandra McLean
Superior Court Judge

# 1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 3 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 1925 Century 4 Park East, Suite 1380, Los Angeles, California 90067. 5 On June 11, 2013 I served the [PROPOSED] ORDER: (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF COASTLINE RE HOLDINGS CORP.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ET AL.; 6 (2) DENYING DEFENDANT MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JÚDGMENT ET AL.; AND (3) DENYING DEFENDANT JOHN O'DEA'S MOTION FOR 7 SUMMARY JUDGMENT ET AL on the interested parties in this action pursuant to the attached service list as follows: 8 9 10 11 By Facsimile Transmission: I caused the above-named document to be transmitted by 12 facsimile transmission, from fax number (310) 388-0664 to the offices of the addressee(s) at the facsimile number(s) indicated on the service list. The transmission was reported as complete 13 and without error. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing 14 is true and correct. Executed on June 11, 2013 at Los Angeles, California 15 16 17 Peter F. Jazayeri 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

# 1 **Service List** Coastline RE Holdings Corp. v. Oroville Self Storage, et al. 2 Peter G. Riechert, Esq. Attorney for Defendant John O'Dea 3 Sarah A. Brooks, Esq. Aaron, Riechert, Carpol & Riffle, APC 4 900 Veterans Boulevard, Suite 600 5 Redwood, California 94063 Telephone: (650) 368-4662 Facsimile: (650) 367-8531 6 7 Lawrence A. Jacobson, Esq. Attorney for Defendant Michael 8 Cohen & Jacobson LLP Cunningham and Oroville Self Storage, 900 Veterans Boulevard, Suite 600 9 Redwood City, California 94063 Telephone: (650) 261-6280 10 Facsimile: (650) 368-6221 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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